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A. The rise and fall of participatory democracy
1. Two decades ago, the revolutionary developments in ICT, facilitated new forms 
of participatory democracy (Blumler and Coleman, 2001) and carried the promise of 
direct and deliberative forms of governance (OECD 2003). The tremendous impact 
of internet on civic life and the subsequent emergence of a transnational online 
public sphere (Cammaerts and von Audenhove, 2005), gave rise to new concepts of 
governance models (Carter et al, 2005; Welch et al, 2004) that were premised on 
web-mediated citizen-state interaction and encouraged an active citizenry (Parent, 
2005).  At the same time the emergence of new intermediaries, namely ICT 
corporations acting as gatekeepers enforcing public polices, gave rise to a new 
wave of techno-determinism (Langdon, 1977) that reshaped the political 
ecosystem: the “invisible handshake” (Birnhack and Elkin-Koren, 2003) between 
the state and the tech industry served well the interests of both, maintaining 
thereby political power and market dominance respectively. What once was the 
promise of an enabler for active citizenry, soon morphed into an opportunity to 
profit from a rapid datafication of the citizens paired with additional surveillance 
mechanisms (Hintz and Brown, 2017). The Snowden revelations in 2013 and the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2018 are indicative cases of severe blows to public 
life: their aftermath was a continuing sentiment of mistrust towards the state 
(Tavani et al, 2014; Cadwallard, 2017) that discouraged citizens from any active 
involvement with the commons.
B. Technology as a building block for demagogic populism
2. We are currently witnessing an era of great disillusionment with democracy and 
civic life: the Democracy Perception Index 2018 survey1 reports that 54% of 
citizens in modern democracies do not feel that their voice has an impact. The 
1 The Democracy Perception Index (DPI) is a research project conducted by Dalia Research, in collaboration with 
the Alliance of Democracies and Rasmussen Global, to measure citizens’ trust in government. Available at 
https://gallery.mailchimp.com/acb575d592ca8c83bb76a5328/files/635a6160-5259-4079-a01b-
ddef9de748af/Democracy_Perception_Index_2018.pdf
2highest levels of dissatisfaction have been reported in Europe, which does not come 
as a surprise given the unstable political climate and several failed attempts to let 
the public decide on delicate (and legally disputable) political matters, carrying 
thereby all responsibility. In the last five years alone, European citizens were asked 
to vote on referenda, yet the results were not materialised: the Catalan 
independence referendum in 2017 was declared illegal, the UK Brexit referendum in 
2016 led to major political turbulence and a series of deliberations currently 
ongoing, and the Greek Bail Out referendum in 2015 was bluntly disregarded by the 
government 3 days after the results were in2. Added to this is the sharp increase of 
immigration, which is further credited as a key factor for the rise of the far-right 
parties in Europe (Halla et al. (2017) for Austria; Dustmann et al. (2016) for 
Denmark; Sekeris and Vasilakis (2016) for Greece; Brunner and Kuhn (2014) for 
Switzerland; Becker and Fetzer (2016) for the UK). 
3. The political sphere in Europe has massively transformed over the past decade 
and technology has a key role in this. The de-legitimisation of old governance 
intermediaries has provided fertile soil for techno-populism ideologies, namely 
bottom-up governance models that further de-politicisation (De Blasio et al, 2018). 
This is not posing a threat to democracy per se, but it certainly has the potential to 
set new paradigms in a disruptive manner (Bloom et al, 2019). Historically 
however, demagogy has thrived on populism (Stanley, 2008) and techno-populism 
is not an exception. In this climate of growing scepticism and disappointment over 
representation, technology is now being used to appeal to the citizens’ emotional 
responses and to reveal their vulnerabilities to demagogues. No doubt technology 
still bears an undeniable potential to support participatory democracy and enhance 
good governance; yet recent instances of AI serving as a means of mass 
manipulation and micro-targeting (noted below) make this a missed opportunity:
C. Computational propaganda: Disinformation and manipulation of 
public life
4. The Cambridge Analytica revelations highlighted a well-known reality: the 
promotional industries of advertising, professional lobbying and marketing have 
2 This does not suggest anything on the politics and/or legality of such held referenda, which in itself is beyond the 
scope of this article, but it merely gives an indication of failed democracy that has led to a trust deficit and disbelief 
towards the state.
3long had an interest in reaching out to the public via “media-buying”, namely 
purchasing space/time on media outlets. Further to this though, it is an indicative 
case of technology used as a means of political manipulation. Instead of 
traditionally reaching out to the public, political actors and promotional industries 
join forces technology: this has led to the phenomenon of computational 
propaganda (Howard and Wooley 2016). In a manifestly data-driven environment, 
the electorate is being treated as a commercial audience, ready to passively 
consume content carefully tailored to each one of the citizens serving thereby 
political purposes. The commercial logic permeating modern politics paired with 
dominant market players in the digital world using sophisticated and social profiling 
practices (Turow 2012) are a serious threat to democracy. 
5. Automation has furthered these practises as AI has already been used on various 
occasions to manipulate public opinion. Take for example political bots, namely AI 
enabled accounts that are programmed to mimic human accounts and can perform 
various manipulative actions online, such as: 
(i) astroturfing, namely bots creating a false perception of popularity by liking 
and sharing particular content on social media (Wooley 2016). The US 
Presidential Election in 2016 is a good example of political bots employed to 
silence genuine political discourse (Howard at al 2018) 
(ii) disinformation, by spreading fake news in an attempt to shape public 
discourse and distort political sentiment. The trending Twitter hashtag 
“#MacronLeaks” in the 2017 French Presidential Election, involved a swarm of 
fake bot accounts that spread fake information about Emmanuel Macron and 
dominated social feeds to cause public sensation 
(iii) trolling, namely bots attacking opposition to a ruling regime, investigative 
journalists and political dissidents online, often using hate speech, so that they 
discourage such voices from partaking to public discourse. This is a disruptive 
tactic used as a tool of social control mainly by authoritarian regimes (Aro 
2016). 
The above suggest a non-exhaustive list of several instance of computational 
propaganda, namely AI enabled manipulative tactics of public discourse3. 
D. Datafication and micro-targeting
3 For more see, European Commission and Content and Technology Directorate-General for Communication 
Networks, A Multidimensional Approach to Disinformation: Report of the Independent High-Level Group on Fake 
News and Online Disinformation. (2018) 12
46. The growing competition among marketeers towards the development of 
sophisticated micro-targeting techniques purporting to reach interested audiences 
as well as to identify potentially interested ones (Alva et al, 2017) has found new 
applications in the political sphere. The ICO commissioned report “The Future of 
political campaigning” (Bartlett et al 2018) offers some valuable insights in this 
respect and identifies several key trends of data analytics serving political 
purposes: 
(i) Audience segmentation and granular information
This provides marketeers with accurate and narrow identification of individuals 
based on analysing data from demographics, behaviour and attitudes.  
(ii) Cross-device targeting
This allows for reaching individuals with messages at a time and place when they 
are mostly receptive to it. By being able to track people, rather than devices, 
political campaigners gain further insights of a voter’s multi-dimensional 
personality, making profiling far more sophisticated than ever before (Moore and 
Tambini, 2018). When this is reviewed in the light of IoT, namely all interconnected 
sensory devices used in each household ranging from Virtual Private Assistants, 
such as Amazon’s Alexa.
(iii) Sentiment analysis and phychographics   
Sentiment analysis has been predominantly used in data science for analysis of 
customer feedbacks on products and reviews. They are used to understand user 
ratings on different kinds of products, hospitality services like travel, hotel 
bookings. It has also become popular to analyse user tweets — positive, negative or 
neutral by crawling twitter through APIs.
7. At the same time, AI has proven to be an excellent tool for gaining insights on 
voting behaviour and behavioral patterns; a good example of this is Mavenoid’s AI 
test (htpps://ai-valet.se) that allows for real time analysis of a few sample 
questions before offering tailored ones to participants. This is a step further from 
the original focus of traditional questionnaires, namely to survey voting intention 
and promises precision as participants cannot game the system with their answers. 
8. Besides the obvious concerns over the grave privacy intrusions of such practices, 
there also additional implications for the individual’s autonomy, free will, and 
5uninfluenced decision making, which are far more subtle and thus hardly 
measurable. Most importantly, the involvement of tech firms in data mining, 
behavioral analytics and micro-targeting with a view to facilitate governmental 
ambitions for control in exchange for market dominance is a trade-off that 
establishes an oligopoly of data market players whilst undermining the core essence 
of democracy: pluralism.
E. Outsourcing governance and accountability: 
AI as a means of addressing the trust deficit in modern politics and 
governance.
9. The digital era furnishes European democracies with an unprecedented 
opportunity for participatory democracy: a mostly tech-savvy interconnected 
community of citizens paired with a supporting legal infrastructure, as evidenced by 
the EU framework for the Digital Single Market. A 2017 Deloitte survey found that 
85% of the UK population have access to a smartphone and this is poised to 
surpass 92% in the next 3 years4. Yet at the same time, computational propaganda 
and the use of AI for micro-targeting and fake content generation and 
dissemination online have already impacted greatly political discourse. Democracy 
has become a commercial product in the digital era: marketed for mass 
consumption and managed by private commercial entities who share clientele with 
political parties for profit. This has resulted in a trust deficit towards the state, 
which in turn has de- legitimised traditional governance models. An interesting 
outcome of this is the paradox of citizens trusting AI driven governance, even if this 
means limited accountability and transparency. In a 2019 survey by the Centre for 
Governance of Change at IE University, a quarter of the participants expressed a 
preference for policy decisions to be made by AI instead of politicians. As noted in 
the report this highlights the following paradox: “while the public is fearful of 
advancements in tech, particularly increased automation, one in four Europeans 
would prefer artificial intelligence to make important to decisions about the running 
of their country. In nations such as the Netherlands, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom, the percentage is even higher – one in every three. Amid the vagaries of 
Brexit and current questions around the European model of representative 
democracy, the results tellingly reflect significant levels of disillusion towards 
politicians.”
10. At a first glance this is an alarming prospect, given the inherent bias (Binns 
2017; Diakopoulos 2014), opacity (Pasquale 2015), and accountability diffusion 
4https://www.deloitte.co.uk/mobileuk2017/assets/img/download/global-mobile-consumer-survey-2017_uk-cut.pdf
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viewed as a natural result of a data driven reality that has led to the amalgamation 
of consumers and voters in a hybrid of e-citizenry: in the same manner, the 
traditional forms of governance have given way to GovTech, which guarantees 
direct governance modelled on business principles and fuelled by big data. 
Businesses have long been relying on algorithms to reach strategic decisions (e.g. 
in the hiring process), following practices that have been criticised on grounds of 
privacy intrusion and discrimination (Williams et al 2018) but undeniably hold great 
potential as well to maximise productivity and innovation (Makridakis 2017). In a 
similar vein, many European countries welcome the involvement of start-ups in AI 
enabled governance: take for example Fluicity, the French start-up running a citizen 
participation cross-regional platform, or Familio, the company behind the Danish 
messaging system between parents and nurseries.
11.  Nonetheless, whereas the main goal of a business entity is profit-making, the 
public sector has a different bet to win when embracing new technologies: to 
provide good governance that sustains democracy through (i) accountability and (ii) 
transparency. The widespread use of algorithmically enabled decision making in 
social settings has given rise to serious concerns as to potential discrimination and 
bias encoded inadvertently in the decision. Moreover, the use of machine learning 
in fields with high levels of accountability -and thus transparency-, such as public 
administration or law enforcement, highlights the need for a clear interpretability of 
outputs. The fact that a human operator might be out of the loop in automated 
decision making, does not preclude that human bias will not part of the result 
yielded by the machine. The absence of due process and human reasoning 
exacerbate the already limited accountability and add to the challenge, as often 
algorithmically driven processes are so complex that their outcomes cannot be 
explained or foreseen, even by their engineering designers: this is often referred to 
as the “black box” in AI. 
12. To this end, the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) includes a series 
of provisions, often referred to as a “right to explanation”. These are art 22 GDPR, 
which addresses automated individual decision making and articles 13, 14, and 15 
GDPR, which focus on transparency rights around automated decision-making and 
profiling. Article 22 GDPR reserves a “right not to be subject to a decision based 
solely on automated processing”, when this decision produces “legal effects” or 
“similarly significant” effects on the individual. Articles 13-15 GDPR involve a series 
of notification rights when information is collected from the individual (art 13) or 
from third parties (art 14) and the right to access this information at any moment 
in time (art 15), providing thereby “meaningful information about the logic 
involved”. Further to this, Recital 71 reserves for the data subject the right “to 
obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to 
7challenge the decision”, where an automated decision has been met that produces 
legal effects or similarly significantly affecting the individual. Although Recital 71 is 
not legally binding, it does however provide guidance as to how relevant articles in 
the GDPR should be interpreted. 
13. There is growing criticism as to whether a mathematically interpretable model 
would suffice to account for an automated decision and guarantee transparency in 
automated decision making. Alternative approaches include ex post auditing and 
focus on the processes around Machine Learning models rather than examining the 
models themselves, which can be inscrutable and non-intuitive (Selbst & Barocas, 
2018).
14. As such, the reliance of public administration on machine learning and 
automated decision-making would not lead to a Kafkaesque dystopia, provided that 
legal mechanisms guaranteeing due process (Coglianese et al 2016) and 
intelligibility are in place. In this vein, the GDPR’s provisions for a right to an 
explanation (art 22) and information (art 15) on automated decision making 
provide some scrutiny tools, yet these are not sufficient (Wachter et al 2017) and 
need better and clearer legal grounding; a good example in this direction is the 
French Digital Republique Act (loi pour une Republique numerique  no. 2016-1321), 
which paired with FOIAs allows for transparent AI enabled public administration 
(Edwards et al 2018).
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